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I. INTRODUCTION
The 1994 Wyoming Legislature substantially revised Wyoming's
comparative negligence statute,' significantly broadening its applicability

1. Wyoming's original comparative negligence statute was enacted in 1973. 1973 Wyo. Sess.
Laws ch. 28 (codified at WYO. STAT. § 1-7.2 (Supp. 1973)). The statute was subsequently renumbered and amended in 1977, and amended again in 1986. 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 188; 1986 Wyo.
Sess. Laws ch. 24. The most recent version of the comparative negligence statute (prior to the 1994
revision) was codified as amended at WYo. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1988). It is reproduced in Appendix A.
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as a defense and renaming it the Wyoming "comparative fault" statute.2
The new statute became effective July 1, 1994, and applies to causes of
action that accrue after that date. 3
The comparative fault statute contains several important provisions.
Some are analogous to provisions of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act
and/or other states' statutes; others are unique. Several provisions are
problematic. Tying the definition of "fault" to proximate cause raises
difficult conceptual and practical problems. Allowing certain types of nonnegligent conduct by a plaintiff and/or other third parties to be a defense
to claims for negligence seems patently unfair. And including nonparties
in the allocation of fault with no procedural safeguards for plaintiffs is
potentially unconstitutional.' How the courts will apply the new statute
given these significant problems raises a number of important issues.
This article summarizes and explains the changes in the law; opines
that the inclusion of nonparties in the allocation of fault without due
process protections for the plaintiff is unconstitutional; proposes jury instructions to be used in interpreting and implementing the statute; and
concludes with suggested amendments to the new statute.5
II. THE CHANGES
A.

Definitions

The new statute begins with a comprehensive definitional section, a
feature which the previous comparative negligence statute did not contain.
The inclusion of such a section is a good idea. Unfortunately, a couple of
the definitions create substantial problems, particularly the definitions of
"actor" and "fault."
1. Actor
The definition of "actor" is both unique and troublesome. It is
unique because Wyoming is the only state that has defined the term. It is

2. 1994 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 98 (codified at WvO. STAT. § 1-1-109 (Supp. 1995)). The new
statute is reproduced in Appendix B.
3. 1994 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 98, §§ 2. 4. Wyoming is a discovery state, meaning that a
cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows, or should know in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of his or her right to recover from a defendant. See Bredthauer v. Christian, Spring, Seilbach
and Associates, 824 P.2d 560, 562 & nn.l-2 (Wyo. 1992).
4. The old statute also permitted the allocation of fault to nonparties. WYO. STAT. § 1-1109(b)(i), (ii) (1988). That provision was never challenged as unconstitutional.
5. The proposed revision to the comparative fault statute appears in Appendix C.
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troublesome because the definition raises both Constitutional and implementation issues.
"Actor" is defined as "a person or other entity, including the
claimant, whose fault is determined to be a proximate cause of the
death, injury or damage, whether or not the actor is a party to the
litigation."6 The use in the definition of the terms "fault," "proximate
cause" and "whether or not the actor is a party" raises important
questions.
The inclusion of "proximate cause" in the definition of actor is
unfortunate for two reasons. First, the phrase "proximate cause" has
traditionally been used in connection with the commission of a tort, negligence in particular. Its use outside of that context is inappropriate and
needlessly confusing. Second, even in the context of tort law, the meaning
of "proximate cause" is murky, at best. The problems with using "proximate cause" out of context are discussed in detail below.7
The reference to "fault" in the definition of "actor" brings in the
new statutory definition of "fault," and is a major change from the old
comparative negligence standard. The reason is that the definition of
"fault" broadens the applicability of the statute beyond the negligence
of the parties (and any nonparty actors) to include other types of nonnegligent conduct by the plaintiff and/or other actors, including conduct that would subject an actor to liability for strict liability, strict
products liability, breach of warranty, assumption of risk and misuse
or alteration of a product.'
"Fault" is a term often used in comparative negligence or fault statutes.
No state, however, has defined it the way Wyoming has. The definition
raises a number of questions, which are discussed in detail below. 9
The most potentially troublesome aspect of the new statute is the
inclusion in the definition of "actor" of a person or other entity "whether
or not the actor is a party to the litigation."' 0 The inclusion of nonparties
in the allocation of "fault" is not new. Wyoming's comparative negligence statute permitted the finder of fact to allocate "fault" to an actor
6. WYO. STAT. § 1-t-109(a)(i) (Supp. 1995).
7. See infra notes 20-35 and accompanying text.
8.

Although the old statute used the word fault several times, "fault" was undefined, and the

Wyoming Supreme Court interpreted the statute to apply only to "negligence" by the plaintiff, not
non-negligent "fault." Phillips v. Duro-Last Roofing, Inc., 806 P.2d 834, 836 (Wyo. 1991). The

court even suggested that the words "negligence" and "fault" were synonymous. Id. at 837 n.3.
Under the new statute they are not.
9. See infrapart II.A.4.

10. WYo. STAT. § 1-I-109(a)(i) (Supp. 1995).
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"whether or not a party."" The inclusion of nonparties in the allocation
of fault under the comparative negligence statute was never challenged as
unconstitutional, though there are good arguments to support such a challenge. 2
The new statute's definition of "actor" is incorporated into the
statute's provision for allocation of fault. A plaintiff (or "claimant," in
the statute's vernacular) may recover if his or her "fault" is not more than
fifty percent of the total fault "of all actors."'" Since the definition of
"actor" includes nonparties, this means that the claimant's fault is measured against the fault of all parties and nonparties that fall within the
definition of "actor," including the claimant's fault.
The inclusion of nonparties in the allocation formula is not per se
unconstitutional; it is common for comparative fault or comparative negligence statutes to include nonparties. Many states' statutes include parties
that have either settled with or been released from liability by the plaintiff. " Others include nonparties other than settling or released parties.'
As discussed in detail below, in the absence of procedural safeguards to
protect the claimant, the inclusion in the allocation equation of nonparties
other than released or settling defendants raises constitutional due process
and equal protection questions.
2.

Claimant

The new statute defines a "claimant" to include a third party
plaintiff and/or a counterclaiming defendant. 6 This definition makes
explicit what was implicit in the old statute. That is, the comparative

11.

Wyo. STAT. § 1-l-109(b)(i)(A), (ii) (1988). The statute used, but did not define, "fault."

The Wyoming Supreme Court interpreted "fault" under the old statute to mean "negligence." Phillips
v. Duro-Last, 806 P.2d at 837 n.3.
12. For a complete discussion of the potential constitutional infirmities of this provision, see
infra part III.C.
13. WYO. STAT. § 1-1-109(b) (Supp. 1995).
14. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h(b) (West 1991) (In a negligence action, the
plaintiff may recover if the plaintiff's contributory negligence "was not greater than the combined
negligence of the ... persons from whom recovery is sought including settled or released persons.");
IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.3.1 (West 1987) (Contributory fault shall not bar recovery "unless the claimant bears a greater percentage of fault than the combined percentage of fault attributed to the defendants, third-party defendants and persons who have been released.").
15. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506(B) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (negligence of a
nonparty may be considered if the defendant gives notice before trial in accordance with court rules);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-111.5(3)(b) (West Supp. 1995) (jury may consider fault of a nonparty if the defendant gives notice that a nonparty was wholly or partially at fault within ninety days
after commencement of the suit).
16. WYo. STAT. § l-1-109(a)(ii) (Supp. 1995).
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fault statute is a defense to a complaint, a counterclaim and/or a thirdparty complaint.
3.

Defendant

"Defendant" is defined as "a party to the litigation against whom a
claim for damages is asserted, and includes third party defendants. Where
there is a counterclaim, the claimant against whom the counterclaim is
asserted is also a defendant." 7 Again, the definition simply clarifies that
the statute works both ways.
4.

Fault

The new definition of "fault" is one of the more significant changes
to the statute. 18 The change makes the new defense of comparative fault
available in far more instances than the old defense of comparative negligence. "Fault:"
includes acts or omissions, determined to be a proximate cause of
death or injury to person or property, that are in any measure
negligent, or that subject an actor to strict tort or strict products
liability, and includes breach of warranty, assumption of risk and
misuse or alteration of a product.' 9
Under the definition, the determination of "fault" is now a two step
process. First, the fact finder must determine whether the actor's "acts or
omissions . . . [were] a proximate cause of death or injury to person or

property." If so, the next question is whether those acts or omissions
were either: (1) "in any measure negligent;" or (2) would "subject an
actor to strict tort or strict products liability." Fault includes "breach of
warranty, assumption of risk, and misuse or alteration of a product." The
revised definition raises important conceptual questions and expands the
defense of comparative fault enormously.
The threshold question focuses only on causation. Was the act or
omission a "proximate cause" of the claimant's injury? The use of "proximate cause," like the definition of "actor," is unusual and troublesome. It
is unusual because only four other states use "proximate" or "proximate-

17. Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-109(a)(iii) (supp. 1995).
18. Although the comparative negligence statute used the term "fault," it was not defined. The
Wyoming Supreme Court held that in the absence of a definition, 'fault" meant "negligence." Phillips v. Duro-Last, 806 P.2d at 837 n.3.
19. WYo. STAT. § 1-1-109(a)(iv) (Supp. 1995).
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ly" in defining fault.20 It is troublesome because of the uncertainty of its
meaning, particularly when the term is not used in conjunction with tortious conduct.
There may be no more commonly used term in tort law than "proximate cause." The reason for its prevalence is that some sort of cause,
usually denominated "proximate cause," is an essential element of every
tort claim. While commonly used, the meaning of "proximate cause" is
elusive. It is, in the words of one commentator, "an extraordinarily
changeable concept ... [it has] 'no integrated meaning of its own, its
chameleon quality permits it to be substituted for any one of the elements
of a negligence case when decision on that element becomes difficult.' "21
But while the concept may be changeable, there are two generally accepted principles in operation.
First, "proximate cause" is the necessary link between a defendant's
tortious conduct and a plaintiff's injury. Second, "proximate cause" is an
important limitation on a defendant's liability for damages which the
defendant helped cause.
As an element of a plaintiffs claim, "proximate cause" refers to
"the notion that 'the accident or injury must be the natural and probable
consequence of" the defendant's tortious conduct.' Defining the contours
of that "notion" has proven to be an impossible task.
Courts and lawyers have proposed many different formulations of
"proximate cause."' Others have abandoned the term as hopelessly unclear.' The Wyoming Supreme Court has used "proximate cause" and

20. The four states are Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506(F)(2) (1994 & Supp.
1995)), Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122(c) (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1995)), Mississippi
(MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-5-7(1) (1991)), and Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37(2) (1992 & Supp.
1995)). Thus far, there are no reported cases interpreting the use of the term in any of these states.
The Uniform Comparative Fault Act defines "fault" broadly, and requires that "[legal requirements
of causal relation apply." UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § l(b), 12 U.L.A. 45 (Supp. 1995).
21. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 42, at 276
(5th ed. 1984) (quoting Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEX. L. REV. 471. 471

(1950)).
22. Natural Gas Processing Co. v. Hull, 886 P.2d 1181, 1186 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting
Bettencourt v. Pride Well Serv.. Inc., 735 P.2d 722, 726 (Wyo. 1987)).
23. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1225-26 (6th ed. 1990) ("That which is nearest in
the order of responsible causation... The last negligent act contributory to an injury ... The moving or producing cause ... The efficient cause ...

act or omission occurring or concurring with

another, which, had it not happened, injury would not have been inflicted.").
24. The Restatement, for example, has rejected the term in favor of "legal cause." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 9 (1965). Similarly, the drafters of the Wyoming Civil Pattern Jury
Instructions recommend that the words "proximate cause" be deleted from the instruction on cause in
favor of "substantial part in bringing about the injury or damage." W.C.P.J.I. No. 3.04 (1994).
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"legal cause" interchangeably.' Whatever the formulation, there is a
second principle at work. There are some cases where a defendant's
tortious conduct that is a cause of a plaintiff's injury should not and does
not lead to liability.
The Wyoming Supreme Court has expressed causation this way:
"Legal cause" must be more than conduct that "created only a condition
or occasion for the harm to occur

. .

.[It must] be a substantial factor in

bringing about the harm."' While that definition may appear to draw a
meaningful distinction between actions or inactions that should lead to
liability and those that do not, it does not. Consider, for example, the
owner of a retail store that fails to clean up spilled liquid. A customer
slips and falls on the liquid. The store owner could argue that the failure
to clean up the liquid "created only a condition or occasion for the
harm," and the store is, therefore, not liable because there was no proximate cause under the standard of Natural Gas Processing Co. v. Hull.
The owner would be wrong.
The slip and fall example is based on the facts of Rhoades v. K-Mart
Corporation.' In that case, the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed a
directed verdict in favor of K-Mart. The court focussed on the foreseeability that liquid could have been spilled, and, without discussing proximate cause, said that there could be liability if the circumstances "were
such as created a reasonable probability that the dangerous condition
would occur. "I There was no allegation or evidence that K-Mart employees were responsible for spilling the liquid on the floor, only an assertion
that they had a duty to discover and clean up the spill. The court found
that the store's failure to remedy the dangerous condition presented a
sufficient question to go to a jury.
The court's inconsistent treatment of proximate cause suggests another rule. Proximate cause exists if proximate cause exists. That, in fact,
is the rule adopted by the Restatement of Torts. "Legal cause" (the Restatement has abandoned "proximate cause") exists "if a) [the actor's]
conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and b) there is
no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in
which his negligence has resulted in the harm."29 The gist is clear. A
defendant is liable if the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in
causing the plaintiff's harm and the law says there is liability. Or, to
25. See, e.g., Natural Gas Processing Co. v. Hull, 886 P.2d 1181, 1186 (Wyo. 1994).
26. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Bell, 703 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Wyo. 1985)).
27. 863 P.2d 626 (Wyo. 1993).
28. Id. at 630.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965).
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paraphrase Justice Potter Stewart,'
they see it.

courts know proximate cause when

Whatever the definition, "proximate cause," or "legal cause," is
both a link between a defendant's tortious conduct and liability, and an
important limitation on the defendant's liability for harm that the
defendant's actions or omissions helped to cause.
A significant problem with the new statute is that the cart has
been placed before the horse. Normally, a jury is asked to decide if a
defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff that was breached before deciding whether that breach was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.
Under the new statute, however, before determining whether a claimant was negligent or is otherwise at fault, the fact finder must first
determine whether the claimant's acts were a "proximate cause" of the
claimant's injuries. 3 Asking a jury to decide whether an act or omission is a proximate cause before deciding whether the actor has
breached a duty to act or not act in a certain way, or whether the actor
should be held to a strict liability standard, is to ask the jury to make a
conclusion about proximate cause without having the necessary foundation, for example, did the actor in question have a duty to act in a
certain way and did he or she do so?
Because "proximate cause" has historically served as the necessary
link between a defendant's conduct and liability, and a limitation on a
defendant's liability, perhaps the best interpretation of "proximate cause"
in Wyoming's comparative fault statute is that the phrase is intended to be
a limitation. That is, there is some conduct by a claimant and/or other
actors which, although causally linked to the claimant's injury, was not a
proximate cause of the claimant's injury. This means that the fact finder
may determine that although the claimant (or any other actor) was a cause
in fact of the claimant's injury, the actor was not a proximate cause of
that injury. Accordingly, the fact finder should not allocate any percentage of fault to the claimant or that actor.
Construing "proximate cause" as a limitation on comparative fault is
consistent with the Wyoming Supreme Court's interpretation of
Wyoming's original comparative negligence statute. That statute provided
for the reduction of a plaintiffs damages in proportion to "the amount of

concurring) ("But I know
30. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
[pornography] when I see it. ... ").
31. WYo. STAT. § 1-1-109(a)(iv) (Supp. 1995). Proximate cause is one of the elements of the
prima facie case of negligence. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 21, § 41, at 263. Therefore, a
determination of whether a party is negligent necessarily entails a finding of proximate cause.
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negligence attributed to the person recovering."32 In construing that statute, the court cautioned that "particular care should be taken .
so that
only the negligence that proximately causes any particular injury is considered by the jury when apportioning fault. "33
Since the new statute empowers the jury to find that an actor that
was a cause in fact of the claimant's injury was not a proximate cause,
the instructions to the jury will need to make the distinction clear, or,
come up with a different method of describing causation. Drawing the
line between cause in fact and proximate cause is difficult for lawyers. It
will be a more difficult task for juries. Of all the attempts to describe the
causation that will lead to liability, the Restatement's is probably the
clearest. Proximate or legal cause exists "if a) [the actor's] conduct is a
substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and b) there is no rule of
law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in which his
negligence has resulted in the harm."'
Under this standard, a court would not, presumably, let the question
of proximate cause go to the jury if there were a rule of law relieving the
actor from liability, even if the actor's acts or omissions were a substantial factor in causing the harm. Assuming no such rule exists, the jury
will be left with the manageable task of deciding whether the actor's
conduct was a substantial factor in causing the claimant's harm. Instructing the jury to focus on whether the actor's conduct was a "substantial
factor" avoids the problem presented by trying to make a distinction between conduct that merely created a condition, and other types of conduct.35 The question for the jury will become whether the defendant's
actions in creating or allowing a dangerous condition were a substantial
factor in causing the harm.
Back to the new statute. If the fact finder determines that the acts or
omissions of an actor were a "proximate cause," there is a second step in
determining fault. The fact finder must determine whether the acts or
omissions: (1) were in any measure negligent; or (2) would subject an
actor to strict tort or strict products liability. 6 The statute contains an
additional clause: "and includes breach of warranty, assumption of risk,

32. Wyo. STAT. § 1-7.2(a) (Supp. 1973). Wyoming's original comparative negligence statute
was enacted in 1973. 1973 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 28 (codified at WvO. STAT. § 1-7.2 (Supp. 1973).
33. Board of County Comm'rs v. Ridenour, 623 P.2d 1174, 1192 (Wyo. 1981) (emphasis added). Despite that cautionary language, Wyoming's Civil Pattern Jury Instructions do not distinguish
between cause and proximate cause. Rather, the jury is to be instructed that a person is at fault when
"that person's negligence is a cause of the injury." W.C.P.J.I. No. 10.01 (1994) (emphasis added).
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965).

35. See infra pp. 39-41 for proposed jury instructions.
36. WYO. STAT. § l-1-109(a)(iv) (Supp. 1995).
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and misuse or alteration of a product. "37 This clause, it appears, is intended to provide examples of the type of conduct that is negligent, that
would subject an actor to strict liability or strict products liability, or that
would be a defense to strict liability or strict products liability. As discussed below, those examples are more confusing than illuminating.
Although awkwardly drafted, the statute makes sense in the context
of a negligence action where the defense is the claimant's contributory
negligence or the negligence of a third party. It does not make sense in
cases involving negligence by the defendant and non-negligent conduct by
the claimant and/or another actor that is raised as a defense.
In a negligence action where the defendant asserts that the claimant's
or another actor's actions were "in any manner negligent," the statute will
operate as the old one did. That is, the defendant's negligent conduct will
be compared with the negligent conduct of the claimant and/or other
actors. Such comparisons have been done for years, and present neither
conceptual nor implementation issues. The difficult issue will arise in
cases where non-negligent conduct is compared with negligent conduct,
which will happen in a variety of circumstances.
"Fault" includes actions or omissions "that subject an actor to strict
tort or strict products liability, and includes breach of warranty, assumption of risk and misuse or alteration of a product." 3 8 This language, which
applies to all actors, including claimants, expands the applicability of the
defense of comparative fault enormously by including several kinds of
non-negligent conduct within the definition of "fault."
The first problem with the provision is determining which language
applies to claimants and which applies to other actors. The statement that
fault includes "acts or omissions that subject an actor to strict liability or
strict products liability

. .

.[or] breach of warranty" cannot be intended

to apply to claimants. The reason is simple. It is nearly impossible to
conjure up circumstances where the acts or omissions of a claimant would
subject him or her to liability for strict liability, strict products liability,
or liability for breach of warranty. Those claims, particularly strict products liability and breach of warranty, have been recognized to allow an
injured consumer to recover in circumstances where the defendant is
better able to bear or spread the loss than a plaintiff.39 Accordingly, the
more reasonable interpretation of the language is to allow the jury to
apportion liability to non-negligent actors other than the claimant, actors

37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334, 342 (Wyo. 1986).
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that may be more like a typical defendant in a strict products liability or
breach of warranty claim.
The language may also have been included to overrule the Wyoming
Supreme Court's decision in Phillips v. Duro-Last Roofing, Inc.,' in
which the court limited the applicability of the comparative negligence
statute to claims for negligence. In so doing, the court refused to apply
the comparative negligence statute to claims based on breach of warranty
and strict liability." The new language overrules Phillips by expressly
providing for a comparison of the claimant's conduct and the defendant's
in an action to recover for personal injury, property injury or death, and
by defining "fault" to include conduct that would subject an actor, including a defendant, to liability for strict liability, strict products liability or
breach of warranty.
The remaining language of the definition, "including assumption of
risk, and misuse or alteration of a product," seems aimed directly at
conduct by claimants. Although the aim may be true, the language misses
the target of clarity.
The statement that fault includes "conduct that would subject an
actor to ...

assumption of risk or misuse or alteration of a product" is

confusing, at best. Since there is no cause of action for assumption of risk
or misuse or alteration of a product, the only time an actor would be
"subject to" those principles is when they are raised as a defense to a
claim. Therefore, the only reasonable reading is that the phrase describes
defenses to a claimant's tort claims. Unfortunately, neither "assumption
of risk" nor "misuse or alteration of a product" has a well-defined meaning, leaving the meaning of the statute murky.
When applied to the tort of negligence, "assumption of risk" has
been confusingly used to describe two distinctly different situations: primary assumption of risk and secondary assumption of risk. Neither concept works with the new statute.
Courts have sometimes referred to "assumption of risk" to describe
what is more precisely described as "primary assumption of risk." Primary
assumption of risk means a plaintiff's voluntary decision, either expressed or
implied, to encounter some known risk, thereby eliminating some duty of
care otherwise owed by a defendant to that plaintiff.42 Although the risk may
be significant, the decision to assume it may be perfectly reasonable.
40. 806 P.2d 834 (Wyo. 1991).

41. Id. at 836-37.
42. See Halpern v. Wheeldon, 890 P.2d 562, 565 (Wyo. 1995); KEETON ET AL., supra note
21, § 68, at pp. 480-81.
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"Secondary assumption of risk," by contrast, is an affirmative defense asserted by a negligent defendant. It refers to conduct by a plaintiff
that is both unreasonable and a substantial factor in bringing about the
harm to the plaintiff. Secondary assumption of risk, in other words, is
just another way to describe contributory negligence.43
When applied to the torts of strict liability or strict products liability,
"assumption of risk" has yet another meaning. Assumption of risk has
been recognized as a defense to strict liability where that liability is based
on a defendant's involvement in an abnormally dangerous activity." Mere
contributory negligence is not enough; where, however, a plaintiff is
aware of the defendant's dangerous activity, the risks that the activity
presents, and voluntarily proceeds to encounter that risk, the plaintiff has
assumed the risk of the dangerous activity and may not recover for harm
caused by that activity.'
Assumption of risk has also been recognized as a defense to a claim
for strict products liability. Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, which is the most widely accepted definition of strict products
liability, ' imposes liability regardless of fault. 7 Nevertheless, certain
conduct by the plaintiff may preclude recovery. If a plaintiff becomes
aware of the danger presented by the product, but continues to use the
product in spite of that knowledge, the plaintiff is said to have assumed
the risk by "voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a
known danger."' This concept suggests that there could be a comparison
between the conduct of the defendant in placing the product in the stream
of commerce and that of the claimant, if the claimant knew about a risk
presented by the product and proceeded to use the product anyway.

43. KEETON ET AL., supra note 21, § 68, at pp. 480-81.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 523 (1977).

44.
45.

Id. § 523 cmt. e.

46. See, e.g.. Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334, 341 (Wyo. 1986) (adopting
§ 402A in Wyoming).
47. The Restatement of Torts is in the process of revision. Tentative Draft No. 2 substantially
revises liability for defective products by creating three categories with two different standards of
liability. The categories are manufacturing defects, design defects, and defects based on inadequate instructions or warnings. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995). The rule
of strict liability applies only to manufacturing defects. Id. § 2(a). Liability for design defects and/or

defective instructions or warnings exists only if the resulting product is "not reasonably safe." Id.
§ 2(b), (c).
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n (1965). The proposed revisions to the
Restatement eliminate categories of conduct by a plaintiff, opting, instead, for a general provision that
apportionment of liability in a products liability case is appropriate whenever a plaintiff, or other
person, "fails to conform to an applicable standard of care." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 12
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995). The comments that follow section 12 contain an extensive discussion
of the pros and cons of separating plaintiffs' conduct into distinct categories.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1996

13

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 31 [1996], Iss. 2, Art. 13
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXXI

There are, accordingly, at least three different definitions of "assumption of risk" floating around the law of torts. Although the new
statute could be construed to refer to any of these forms of assumption
of risk in any given case, it should not be. Only the last meaning
makes sense.
If "assumption of risk" is construed, in a negligence case,49 to refer
to primary assumption of risk, the proper question is whether the plaintiff
voluntarily assumed a known risk, and thereby eliminated the duty of care
owed by a defendant. If the jury finds such an assumption of risk, the
case is over.5" Since the defendant owed the claimant no duty of care, the
claim for negligence fails. There is no need for any subsequent comparison of the conduct of the claimant and the defendant (since the defendant
owes no duty, his or her conduct is, by definition, not negligent). Therefore, interpreting "assumption of risk" to mean primary assumption of
risk would render the term meaningless, a result contrary to the rules of
statutory construction, 5 because there is no negligent conduct by the
defendant.
If the statute is interpreted to refer to secondary assumption of risk,
that is, contributory negligence, the language becomes nothing more than
a restatement of the previous sentence, which includes negligent conduct
within the definition of fault. Once again, such an interpretation would
render the "assumption of risk" language surplusage (unless the language
is intended simply to be an example of conduct which is "in any measure
negligent"). The only interpretation that makes sense is that "assumption
of risk" refers to conduct by a claimant that may be a defense to a claim
for strict liability or strict products liability.
Assumption of risk must refer to a plaintiff knowingly and unreasonably proceeding in the face of a known risk presented by an abnormally
dangerous activity or an unreasonably dangerous product. In that context,
the claimant's actions should not be a defense unless they are something
more than mere failure to discover the danger, that is, more than mere
contributory negligence. Such an interpretation gives meaning to the term
and is consistent with generally accepted tort defenses.
49. As noted earlier, the proposed revisions to the Restatement treat design defects and defects

resulting from inadequate instructions or warnings more like negligence cases. See supra note 47.
50. In cases alleging defective design, a plaintiff's assumption of an obvious and open risk may
not preclude recovery. See, e.g., Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 577 (N.Y. 1976) (The
court found that a manufacturer of an obviously defective product may be held liable even though the
plaintiff was aware of the risk. The plaintiff's actions may, however, be considered by the jury in
evaluating comparative negligence.).
51. Bowen v. State, 900 P.2d 1140, 1143 (Wyo. 1995) ("We construe the statute as a whole,
giving effect to each word, clause, sentence . . . ." (citation omitted)).
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The use in the statute of "misuse or alteration of a product" is also
directed at conduct of claimants. Once again, the precise meaning of the
words is regrettably murky. It seems, rather obviously, to be intended to
make misuse or alteration of a product into a defense to strict products
liability; the term has no apparent application to any other types of
claims. The meaning is a bit murky because the language used does not
expressly confine the defense to such claims, and the language is not
consistent with the Wyoming Supreme Court's explication of the defense
in strict products liability cases.
Section 402A makes the imposition of strict products liability contingent upon a showing by the plaintiff that the product "is expected to and
does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold." 2 The Wyoming Supreme Court has interpreted
that language to mean that "[m]isuse of a product by using it for an unintended or unforeseeable purpose would

. . .

bar recovery under strict

liability." 5"

The court subsequently expanded the defense beyond "unintended or unforeseeable" use to include "an obviously dangerous manner"
of using the product for an intended or foreseeable use. 4 The result of the
two decisions is that product misuse is a defense to strict products liability
if such misuse was unintended, unforeseeable, or the product was used in
an obviously dangerous way that was not foreseeable. Furthermore, although not explicit in the Wyoming Supreme Court's opinions, misuse or
alteration should not be a defense unless the misues or alteration was
negligent.55
Although the statute's use of "misuse or alteration" makes it
unclear whether the intention was to incorporate the previously recognized defenses, that is the sensible result. "Misuse or alteration of a
product" should mean unintended use, unforeseeable use, or use in an
obviously dangerous manner. Such an interpretation incorporates the
existing law in Wyoming regarding product misuse. Such a construction is also consistent with the statutory language that fault means an
act or omission that is "in any measure negligent
cludes ...misuse or alteration of a product." 56

. . .

and in-

52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1)(b) (1965). Liability extends to an alteration
or misuse of the product that was reasonably foreseeable. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 21. § 102.

53. Schneider Nat'l, Inc. v. Holland Hitch Co., 843 P.2d 561, 582 (Wyo. 1992) (citation
omitted).
54.
55.
Draft No.
product is
56.

Anderson v. Louisiana-Pacific, 859 P.2d 85, 88 (Wyo. 1993).
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 12 reporter's note cmt. c at 307 (Tentative
2, 1995) (stating that most courts take the position that negligent misuse or alteration of a
a defense to a strict products liability claim).
WYo. STAT. § 1-1-109(a)(iv) (Supp. 1995).
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As a result of the ambiguities in the greatly expanded definition
of "fault," the defendant in a strict liability action or a strict products
liability action could attempt to defend on the basis that the claimant
was at fault because of negligent conduct or non-negligent conduct that
would subject the claimant to the defenses of "assumption of risk, and
misuse or alteration of a product." 7 The defendant could also allege
that some other actor was at fault for conduct that would subject that
actor to "strict liability, strict products liability

. .

. [or] breach of

warranty." Allowing such comparisons is to the obvious advantage of
defendants and the obvious disadvantage of plaintiffs. It also undercuts
the very basis for imposing strict liability or strict products liability.
Strict liability is premised on the notion that there are occasions
that a defendant should be held responsible for an injury to another
regardless of whether the defendant acted reasonably. Liability exists
if the defendant has engaged in some abnormally dangerous activity
which was the proximate cause of harm to the plaintiff. 8 Strict liability, in other words, is "liability without fault." 59 And while there are
defenses to strict liability, the claimant's negligence has not been a
defense unless the plaintiff knowingly and unreasonably subjected
himself to the risk, that is, assumed the risk.'
Strict products liability is also imposed without regard to a
defendant's fault. A seller of consumer products is liable "although the
seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product."61 Once again, liability is imposed in the absence of fault.
Liability is imposed, instead, because when a defective product enters
the stream of commerce and an innocent person is injured, "it is better
that the loss fall on the manufacturer, distributor or seller than on the
innocent victim."62 As with strict liability, the plaintiff's contributory
negligence was not a defense to strict products liability unless the
plaintiff knowingly and unreasonably used an unreasonably dangerous
product or a product in an unreasonably dangerous way.63

57. If "misuse or alteration" is interpreted to mean negligent misuse or alteration of a product,
simple misuse would not be a defense.
58. See KEETON Er AL., supra note 21, § 78.
59. Id. § 75.
60. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 524 (1977).
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(a) (1965) (adopted in Ogle v. Caterpillar

Tractor Co.. 716 P.2d 334, 341 (Wyo. 1986)).
62. Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d at 342.
63.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (cited in Anderson v. Louisiana-Pacif-

ic, 859 P.2d 85, 89 (Wyo. 1993)).
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As with claims for strict liability or strict products liability, an action for breach of warranty was not premised on any unreasonable conduct by the defendant. Rather, allowing recovery for breach of warranty
provides a method of allocating loss to the cheapest cost avoider, regardless of fault.6 The action may sound either in tort or contract.65 It is generally based, however, on theories of express or implied warranties under
the Uniform Commercial Code, which has been adopted in Wyoming.6
Neither contributory nor comparative negligence is a defense to an action
for breach of warranty.6 7
Allowing the claimant's contributory negligence to be a defense to
claims for strict liability, strict products liability or breach of warranty
erodes the concept of liability without fault. And liability without fault is
the cornerstone of those claims.
Similarly, allowing the non-negligent fault of the claimant and/or
other actors to be a defense to negligence causes of action also erodes the
foundation of negligence law; liability based on fault (a defendant's unreasonable actions).
The new definition of fault presents at least two significant issues.
First, the breadth of the definition of "fault" will hold a claimant, in at
least some instances, to a higher standard than the defendant. Second, the
non-negligent acts or omissions of actors other than the claimant will be a
defense to the defendant's negligence.
By defining "fault" to include a claimant's assumption of risk or
misuse of a product, regardless of whether the claimant acted unreasonably, the statute skews traditional tort doctrine by holding the claimant to
a strict liability standard. In an action for strict liability, strict products
liability or breach of warranty, the defendant may defend on the basis that
the claimant was contributorily negligent, even if that contributory negligence does not rise to the level of assumption of risk. In a negligence
action, the claimant will be able to recover only if the defendant acted
unreasonably. The defendant may be allowed to defend even if the
claimant's misuse of a product was reasonable.
In addition, the defendant will also be allowed to claim the "fault"
of a non-negligent third party actor as a defense on the basis that such
acts or omissions might subject the actor to liability for strict liability,
strict products liability or breach of warranty-actions unrelated to fault in
the traditional sense.
64. Schneider Nat'l, Inc. v. Holland Hitch Co., 843 P.2d 561, 587 (Wyo. 1992).

65. Id. at 586.
66. Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d at 338 n.2.
67. Schneider Nat'l, Inc. v. Holland Hitch Co., 843 P.2d at 586.
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a claim of negligence against a
defend on the basis that the
a proximate cause of his or her
conduct of other actors was a

X is a house painter. She buys an extension ladder from Y, who is
in the business of supplying equipment to housing contractors (Y obtained
the ladder from Z, a wholesaler of such equipment). Y normally inspects
each ladder after removing it from the shipping box and before it is sold.
This time, however, Y was in a hurry. She sold the ladder to X without
an inspection. As it turns out, an inspection would have disclosed a serious structural flaw in one of the rungs. X used the ladder on her next job.
Because she was short of scaffolding, she jury-rigged the ladder to support one end of a plank. When she stepped on the plank, the defective
rung broke, sending X plunging to the ground. She sues Y for negligently
failing to inspect the ladder.
Y defends, claiming that X was at fault for misusing the product,
and that Z, the wholesaler, would be subject to strict products liability
under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,' and/or breach
of warranty (assume that X did not sue Z for whatever reason). Assume
X's misuse does not rise to the level of contributory negligence because it
was not unreasonable. Similarly, assume Z did nothing more than act as
the intermediary between the manufacturer of the ladder and the retailer
(Z never even opened the shipping box). Nevertheless, under the language
of the new statute, the conduct of each falls within the definition of
"fault," and can be a defense to Y's negligence.
X's non-negligent misuse of the product is arguably a form of
"fault." 69 And Z's non-negligent involvement could subject Z to liability
for strict products liability or breach of warranty. It, too, is "fault."
Under the new statute, the jury would be allowed to reduce, or even
eliminate, X's recovery by apportioning fault to X and/or Z, despite Y's
negligent conduct and the absence of negligence by X or Z.
One consequence of allowing non-negligent conduct to reduce a
claimant's recovery in a negligence action is that claimants will, at
least potentially, receive reduced awards, or no awards at all, in situa-

68. As discussed above, the proposed revisions to the Restatement might well change the result. See supra note 47.
69. As noted above, misuse or alteration of a product should not be a defense unless such use

or alteration was negligent. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. The words of the statute, however, do not dictate that construction.
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tions where they could have recovered fully under the old system of
contributory negligence. In the above example, X's non-negligent
actions would not have been a defense under the old doctrine of contributory negligence because they were not unreasonable. Accordingly,
X could have fully recovered because X was not contributorily negligent. A plaintiff's non-negligent conduct was not, generally, a defense
to negligence. 7' Similarly, the non-negligent conduct of other actors
was not a defense at common-law or under the old comparative negligence statute."
Allowing non-negligent conduct to reduce or eliminate a claimant's
recovery seems contrary to decades of American tort law. The reasons for
such a drastic change are unclear. Courts and juries have, for years,
successfully meted out justice based on a comparison of the negligence of
the plaintiff, the defendant and, in some cases, other actors. Now, in at
least some circumstances, juries will be allowed to compare a defendant's
negligent conduct with the non-negligent conduct of the claimant and
other actors. The benefit to defendants is obvious. The detriment to plaintiffs is equally apparent.
5. Injury to person or property
The new statute applies to actions to recover damages for "wrongful
death or injury to person or property." The phrase "injury to person or
property" is defined extremely broadly, continuing the pattern of expanding the availability of the defense of comparative fault. "Injury to person
or property" means:
in addition to bodily injury, without limitation, loss of enjoyment
of life, emotional distress, pain and suffering, disfigurement,
physical or mental disability, loss of earnings or income, damage
to reputation, loss of consortium, loss of profits and all other such
claims and causes of action arising out of the fault of an actor.'
It is hard to envisage any form of injury that does not come within
the definition. The applicability of the defense of comparative fault is,
however, limited by the definition of "fault." It is limited because the
new statute provides for the comparison of the claimant's "fault" with
70. A plaintiffs non-negligent (primary) assumption of risk was available as a defense to a
negligence claim. See supra text accompanying note 42.
71.

A defendant could have brought a party that was potentially liable to that defendant into the

case as a third-party defendant. See, e.g., WYO. R. Civ. P. 14.
72. WYO. STAT. § l-l-109(a)(v) (Supp. 1995).
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that of the other actors, including the defendant. Where the conduct of the
defendant is not "fault" as defined by the statute, there is no basis for a
comparison.
"Fault" does not include actions or omissions that would subject an
actor to liability for an intentional tort or a tort based on reckless conduct.
So although comparative fault is no longer simply a defense to negligence
claims, the defense of fault will be inapplicable in those cases where the
defendant's actions do not fall within the definition of "fault."
6.

Wrongful death

"Wrongful death" is defined by referring to the statutory cause of
action for wrongful death.73 Accordingly, comparative fault will be a
defense to a claim brought when the death of a person "is caused by
wrongful act, neglect or default such as would have entitled the party
injured to maintain an action to recover damages if death had not ensued." 74 Once again, the decedent's non-negligent conduct, or the nonnegligent conduct of third party actors, may be a defense to a defendant's
negligent conduct.
B.

Comparative FaultReplaces Comparative Negligence

As the change in the name of the statute and the definition of "fault"
make clear, "comparative fault" has replaced "comparative negligence" as a
defense. The result is that "contributory fault" is now available as a defense
in an action to recover damages for "wrongful death or injury to person or
property" where the fault of two or more actors can be compared. As discussed above, the only limitation of the applicability of the defense is the
definition of fault, which does not include intentional or reckless conduct.
C.

Comparative Fault Applies Even Where the Claimant is Free From
Fault; CourtMust Inform the Jury of the Consequences of Its Allocation of Fault
1. Comparative fault statute applies even where the claimant is free
from fault

The new statute applies "[w]hether or not the claimant is free of
fault."' This means that joint and several liability is abolished in all

73. WYo.

STAT.

§ l-1-109(a)(vi) (Supp. 1995).

74. WYO. STAT. § 1-38-101 (1988).
75. WYO. STAT. § 1-1-109(c) (Supp. 1995).
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cases arising under the statute, regardless of whether the claimant is
without fault.76
2.

Court must inform the jury of the consequences of its allocation
of fault

The new statute requires the court to inform the jury "of the consequences of its determination of the percentage of fault."" The old statute,
by contrast, provided that the court "may, and when requested by any
party shall" inform the jury of the consequences of its determination of
the percentage of fault.7"
The allocation of fault under the old statute had at least five consequences: (1) a plaintiff could recover only if the plaintiff's contributory
negligence did not exceed fifty percent of the total negligence; (2) the
court would reduce the plaintiff's damages by the percentage of fault
allocated to the plaintiff; (3) each defendant was liable only to the extent
that the jury allocated fault to that defendant; (4) if a defendant to whom
the jury allocated fault was insolvent or judgment proof the plaintiff
would not be able to collect that portion of the verdict; and (5) a plaintiff
could not recover (at least in this action) for negligence allocated to a
nonparty. It appears, however, that courts did not always inform the jury
of all such consequences.
The Wyoming Civil Pattern Jury Instructions suggest that the jury be
informed of the first three consequences, leaving the jury unaware of the
other consequences. 79 The Wyoming Supreme Court held that the old
statute's language to "[i]nform the jury of the consequences of its determination of the percentage of fault" meant that the jury should also be apprised of
the fifth. Either the jury verdict form or the statement of the issues should
advise the jury who among the actors has "available pockets," and who is
included only for purposes of allocating fault.' The only effect of which the

76. Subdivision (a) of the old statute said that "[clontributory negligence shall not bar a recovery." Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-109(a) (1988). Since the abolition of joint and several liability was contained
in subdivision (d) of that statute, it was possible to argue that no part of the statute would apply in the
absence of some contributory negligence by the plaintiff. (One could also argue, of course, that subdivision (d) applied regardless of the applicability of subdivision (a)).
This was a potentially very significant omission. If the statute did not apply in the absence of
the plaintiff's contributory negligence, the statutory abolition of joint and several liability, which was
a part of the contributory negligence statute, would arguably not apply. That issue was never raised
before the Wyoming Supreme Court.
77. WYo. STAT. § l-1-109(C)(ii) (Supp. 1995).
78. Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-109(b) (1988).
79. See, e.g., W.C.P.J.I. Nos. 10.03, 10.05 (1994).

80. Burton v. Fisher Controls Co., 723 P.2d 1214, 1222 n.6. (Wyo. 1986).
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jury was apparently not informed is the fourth; that a plaintiff cannot recover
the percentage of fault allocated to insolvent or judgment-proof defendants."'
The new statute has similar "consequences." Under the Wyoming
Supreme Court's holding in Burton, it is clear that the jury should be informed of at least every consequence other than the plaintiffs inability to
recover from an insolvent or judgment proof defendant. The argument for
not informing the jury of that consequence is that it is a result of a
defendant's financial status, not a consequence of the jury's allocation of
fault.
Whether to advise a jury of the consequences of its allocation of
fault has been a subject of considerable debate and disagreement among
states.' On one side are the proponents of the "blindfold" rule, under
which the jury is not informed of the effect of allocating fault to the
plaintiff. On the other are those that support informing juries of the consequences of their decisions.
The clear trend is away from the blindfold rule, also known as
the "Wisconsin rule," to allowing or requiring the court to inform a
jury of the consequences of its decisions. Only five states still adhere
to the blindfold rule.83 Ten states permit the court to inform the jury of
the effect of its ruling.' Thirteen states, now including Wyoming, require that the jury be so informed.' The remaining states either do not

81. The jury is also not informed of the amount of a plaintiffs settlement with other potential
defendants. Haderlie v. Sondgeroth, 866 P.2d 703, 714 (Wyo. 1993).
82. See, e.g., Stuart F. Schaffer, Comment, Informing the Jury of the Legal Effect of Special Verdict Answers in Comparative Negligence Actions, 1981 DUKE L.J. 824; Michael J.
Norton, Comment, McGinn v. Utah Power & Light Co.-Jury Blindfolding in Comparative
Negligence Cases, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 569; Glenn E. Smith, ComparativeNegligence Problems
With the Special Verdict: Informing the Jury of the Legal Effects of Their Answers, 10 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 199 (1975).
83. Kentucky (Robinson v. Murlin Phillips & MFA Ins. Co., 557 S.W.2d 202 (Ky. 1977));
Michigan (Mitchell v. Perkins, 54 N.W.2d 293 (Mich. 1952)); Ohio (McClure v. Neuman, 178
N.E.2d 621 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961)); Texas (TEX. R. CIv. P. 277); and Wisconsin (McGowan v.
Story, 234 N.W.2d 325 (Wis. 1975)).
84. Georgia (Ebanks v. Southern Ry. Co., 640 F.2d 675, 678 (5th Cir. 1981)); Idaho (Seppi v.
Betty, 579 P.2d 683, 692 (Idaho 1976)); Kansas (Nail v. Doctor's Bldg., Inc., 708 P.2d 186, 188 (Kan.
1985)); Massachusetts (Morgan v. Lalumiete, 493 N.E.2d 206, 209 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986)); New Jersey
(Roman v. Mitchell, 413 A.2d 322, 327 (N.J. 1980) (court should inform jury of effect of answers to interrogatories, but has the discretion to withhold)); New York (Schabe v. Hampton Boys Union Free Sch.
Dist., 480 N.Y.S.2d 328, 337 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)); Oklahoma (Smith v. Gizzi, 564 P.2d 1009, 1013
(Okla. 1979)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 18.480(2) (1988)); Utah (Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591, 5%
(Utah 1982) (upon request of a party, the court shall inform the jury of the effects of its allocation unless it
finds issues are so complex that to do so would confuse the jury)); and West Virginia (Adkins v. Whitten,
297 S.E.2d 881, 884 (W. Va. 1982) (court has a duty to inform jury when so requested)).
85. Colorado (CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-111.5(5) (West Supp. 1995)); Connecticut
(CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h(e) (West 1991)); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-31(d)
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allow comparative fault or have no reported case law or statutes on
point .

6

Although considerable attention and litigation have been devoted to
the issue of informing the jury, there is no empirical evidence on whether
advising a jury of the consequences of its allocation of fault is beneficial
to the plaintiff or the defendant(s). For now, at least, the issue in Wyoming is moot. The new Wyoming statute requires the court to instruct the
jury as to the consequences of its decision.
D.

Extent of Defendants' Liability Clarified

Former subdivision (d), now subdivision (e), was amended with the
apparent objective of making it clear that a defendant is liable "only to
the extent" of the fact finder's allocation of fault.

7

The amendment makes

no substantive change to the old statute.
III. THE INCLUSION OF NONPARTIES IN THE ALLOCATION OF FAULT
SUGGESTS A NEED FOR PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS FOR THE PLAINTIFF8s

A.

Introduction

There may be a number of potentially liable defendants in a lawsuit.
A plaintiff often believes it to be advantageous to join as many defendants
as possible. There are times, however, when a plaintiff either cannot join
or decides not to join one or more of the potential defendants. One set of
questions arises when a plaintiff cannot join a potential defendant. Another set arises when a plaintiff decides not to join a potential defendant.

B.

Potential Nonparties
There are four important categories of nonparties: (1) settling

nonparties; (2) inadvertently omitted nonparties; (3) intentionally omitted

(1995)); Illinois (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, para. 2-1107.1 (Smith-Hurd 1992)); Indiana (IND. CODE

ANN. § 34-4-33-5(b) (Bums Supp. 1995)); Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.3(5) (West 1987)); Louisiana (Porche v. Gulf Miss. Marine Corp., 390 F. Supp. 624, 632 (E.D. La. 1975)); Maine (ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (West 1980)); Minnesota (MINN. R. Civ. P. 49.01(B)); Nebraska (NEB.
REV. STAT. § 25-21.185.09 (1992)); Pennsylvania (Peair v. Home Assoc. of Enola Legion, 430 A.2d
665, 672 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981)); Tennessee (Mclntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Tenn.
1992)); and Wyoming (WYO. STAT. § 1-1-109(c)).
86. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act is silent on the issue.
87. WYO. STAT. § 1-1-109(e) (Supp. 1995).
88. The inclusion of nonparty actors is not a new provision; the old statute also included nonparty actors in the allocation of fault. WYO. STAT. § 1-1-109(b) (1988).
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nonparties; and (4) immune nonparties. There are different reasons for not
joining potential defendants in each category. The reasons for non-joinder in
some situations highlight the need for procedural safeguards to protect the
plaintiff and the defendants that are joined, and the need for additional safeguards to implement Wyoming's new comparative fault statute.
1. Settling nonparties
It is common for one or more potential defendants to settle with a
plaintiff before trial. By settling, a potential defendant achieves finality; that
defendant will never have to make any additional payment to the plaintiff. By
definition, therefore, the plaintiff knows the identity of a settling party; there
is at least some colorable legal basis to recover from that party; and the
plaintiff has been able to find and communicate with that party. Further, the
plaintiff has made a judgment that a settlement is in the plaintiff's best interests. Accordingly, the due process concerns that arise when a plaintiff does
not know about or is not able to join a potential defendant are not present.
Rather, the only question that may arise is how should the fact finder's allocation of fault to the settling nonparty affect the plaintiffs judgment; that
question is easily answered in Wyoming.
There should be no concern about the fact finder allocating fault to a
settling nonparty. After all, the reason the nonparty actor settled is, presumably, the fear of being found at least partially at fault for the
plaintiffs injuries. More importantly, the plaintiff knows that the nonsettling parties will attempt to persuade the fact finder to allocate all, or at
least a majority, of the fault to the settling nonparty, and the plaintiff has
made a considered judgment that settlement is, nevertheless, in the
plaintiffs best interest. The question then becomes what is the effect of a
partial settlement on a plaintiff's overall recovery.
The new statute specifies that "[e]ach defendant is liable only to the
extent of that defendant's proportion of the total fault" allocated to that
defendant by the fact finder.89 The amount of any settlement, therefore, is
irrelevant to the liability of the remaining defendants.9 Each defendant
will be responsible for the share of liability allocated to that defendant by
the jury, no more and no less. The settling defendant is liable for the

89. Wyo. STAr. § 1-1-109(e) (Supp. 1995).
90. The non-settling defendant does not receive credit for amounts paid to the plaintiff in
settlement. The defendant that goes to trial must pay the full amount of damages allocated by the jury
to that defendant, regardless of whether the plaintiff is over or undercompensated. Haderlie v.
Sondgeroth, 866 P.2d 703, 710 (Wyo. 1993). Although Haderlie was decided under the old statute,
there should be no difference under the new statute.
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amount of the settlement, no more and no less (assuming a release was
given by the plaintiff). This may result in a settling plaintiff being under
or overcompensated.
Assume, for example, that plaintiff P has a claim against X and Y. P
settles with Y for $100,000. At trial, the jury allocates fault as follows: P
= 20 percent; X = 30 percent; and Y = 50 percent. The jury awards

damages of $100,000. Under the new statute, X is liable for 30 percent of
$100,000, or $30,000. Under the new statute, P would have been entitled
to collect $30,000 from X, and $50,000 from Y if both had gone to trial.
Yet P is allowed to collect $30,000 from X and keep the $100,000 already received from Y. The result is that P is overcompensated, recovering a total of $130,000 ($100,000 settlement from Y; $30,000 from X).
According to the jury's allocation of fault, however, P should have received only $80,000 (80 percent of the jury verdict of $100,000).
The plaintiff may also be undercompensated. Assume the same facts
except that the jury awards $300,000 (P is 20 percent at fault, X is 30
percent, and Y is 50 percent). To be fully compensated P should receive
$240,000 (80 percent of the verdict). Instead, P receives $190,000
($100,000 settlement from Y; and $90,000, 30 percent of the verdict,
from X).
Although the statute may result in under or overcompensation in
any particular case, it has the great virtue of clarity. Plaintiffs and
defendants alike will know the potential risks and/or benefits of settling before trial. The statute does nothing to discourage settlement,
and may even provide an incentive to settle (the incentive of certainty). Further, it should not, unlike some schemes, provide a reason for
defendants to race to settlement. 9
2.

Intentionally omitted nonparties

A plaintiff may decide not to sue a potential defendant for a variety
of reasons. Those reasons may include "whim, spite, collusion, or any
possible tactical or personal consideration. "92 For example, a plaintiff

91. In California, for example, prior to the adoption of the Fair Responsibility Act, the treatment of settling defendants or potential defendants created an incentive for one party to settle as
quickly as possible. The reason was that the remaining defendant(s) could be liable for more than
their "share" of the damages since the doctrine of joint and several liability survived the adoption of
comparative fault. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 899, 901 (Cal. 1978).
92. Leonard E. Eilbacher, Comparative Fault and the Nonparty Tortfeasor, 17 IND. L. REV.
903, 912 (1993) (quoting Goldenberg & Nicholas, Comparative Liability Among Joint Tortfeasors:
The Aftermath ofLi v. Yellow Cab Co., 8 U. WEST L.A. L. REV. 23, 45 (1976)).
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may not want to sue a family member or friend that was involved in an
automobile accident, even though that individual may have been a proximate cause of the accident.
A plaintiff that makes the decision to omit a potential defendant, an
"actor" in the statute's parlance, may pay a significant price for doing so.
This is because the omitted "actor" will still appear on the verdict form
and may be allocated part of the fault. Furthermore, since joint and several liability was abolished in Wyoming with the 1986 amendments to the
comparative negligence statute, 93 the remaining defendant(s) will not be
required to pay any portion of the verdict allocated to the omitted actor.
Also, the remaining defendant(s) will defend on the basis that it was all
the fault of the omitted nonparty actor, thereby putting an additional
burden on the plaintiff, who will have to prove that the remaining defendants were responsible for the plaintiff's injuries.
Although the price of omitting a known, potential defendant may be
high, that decision, presumably, is an informed one. As discussed above
with respect to settling nonparties, there is no compelling need for due
process protections for the plaintiff that omits a known potential defendant
that is subject to the court's jurisdiction. The plaintiff's protection comes
from access to counsel to advise the plaintiff about the potential costs and
benefits of omitting a known potential defendant, including the additional
burden that the plaintiff will assume at trial.
3.

Inadvertently omitted nonparties

A plaintiff may inadvertently omit a potentially liable party. The
most common reasons are the plaintiffs lack of diligence or inability to
discover all potentially liable parties. In a complex products liability suit,
for example, the plaintiff may fail or be unable to discover that an unnamed actor actually manufactured a component of the allegedly defective
product. At trial, the named defendant(s) will, and ought to be able to,
point the finger of liability at the manufacturer of the component, even if
that manufacturer is not a named party.
Allowing the allocation of fault to a nonparty actor raises two concerns. First, the remaining defendant(s) will to try to shift the blame to a
nonparty inadvertently omitted by the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff will
be unable to recover for any portion of liability allocated to nonparties.
This raises the specter of the plaintiff trying to battle a ghost; if the ghost
wins, the plaintiff will not be adequately compensated.

93. 1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 24.
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Unless notified before trial that the defendant(s) will raise the defense that a hitherto unknown nonparty is at fault, the plaintiff is, by
definition, without information to counter the assertion that a nonparty is
responsible for the injury. That inability will translate into a greater allocation of fault to the nonparty, and a corresponding reduction in the
plaintiffs recovery. Not only will the plaintiff be sandbagged at trial, the
plaintiff may be unable to join the inadvertently omitted defendant because of the passage of a statute of limitations or jurisdictional problems.
The question thus becomes what safeguards, if any, ought to be in place
to enable the plaintiff to respond effectively to the defense that the
plaintiffs injuries were caused by an inadvertently omitted nonparty.
The new statute has no procedural safeguards to protect a claimant
from the defense that an unknown nonparty is responsible for claimant's
damages.'e The absence of any such safeguards calls into serious question
the constitutionality of the inclusion of such nonparties in the allocation of
liability. That issue is discussed in detail below."
4.

Immune Nonparties

Certain actors are immune from tort liability in certain circumstances. The primary groups of immune actors are employers, co-employees,
and government employees."
a. Employers
The immunity provided to employers and co-employees under the
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act' presents troublesome issues when
read in conjunction with the comparative fault statute.
An employer that participates in Wyoming Worker's Compensation
enjoys absolute immunity from suit by an injured employee who is injured while on the job. The "exclusive remedy" of an employee who
suffers an injury "arising out of and in the course of employment" is a

94. It is possible, of course, for the claimant to attempt to learn of the existence of other actors
through discovery.

95. See infra
part III.C.
96. There are other types of tort immunity in Wyoming. The Wyoming Supreme Court has not
abrogated the doctrine of charitable immunity, although it is seldom used as a defense. See Lutheran
Hosp. and Homes Soc'y of Am. v. Yepsen, 469 P.2d 409, 411 (Wyo. 1970). In recent years, the
Legislature has enacted statutes providing immunity for individuals acting in a variety of contexts,
including the sponsors of amateur rodeos (WYO. STAT. § 1-1-118 (1988)); governmental boards
(WYO. STAT. § 1-23-107 (Supp. 1995)); volunteers acting on behalf of nonprofit organizations (WYO.
STAT. § 1-1-25 (Supp. 1995)); members of volunteer fire departments (Wyo. STAT. § 35-9-701
(1994)); and reporters of suspected child abuse (WYO. STAT. § 14-3-209 (1994)).
97. WyO. STAT. §§ 27-14-101 to -805 (1991 & Supp. 1995).
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claim for Worker's Compensation benefits.98 The employer's immunity
extends even to intentional torts. 99
Co-employees enjoy more limited immunity. A co-employee is
immune for acts committed within the scope of employment unless the coemployee "intentionally act[s] to cause physical harm or injury."i"
The immunity of employers and co-employees does not extend to
third parties, such as suppliers or manufacturers, that may have been
involved in the incident that led to the employee's injury.' Such parties
may even have a right to indemnity against the employer.'
A case involving multiple actors, including an employer and/or a coemployee, may put the plaintiff in a difficult position. Assuming it is not
possible to sue either the employer or a co-employee, the obvious defense
for those parties subject to suit is to blame the employer, the co-employee, or both. This will put the plaintiff in the position of having to prove
both liability and that the employer and/or co-employee are not at fault,
or at least not much at fault.
The immunity provided by the Worker's Compensation Act is not, at
least, going to surprise a plaintiff. The plaintiff should know early on
who is immune and who is not. The plaintiff will then be in a position to
decide whether it is worth proceeding, and how to best counter the inevitable defense that the injury was primarily the fault of an immune actor.
Since the decision to afford immunity is a legislative one, there is little a
plaintiff can do about it, other than consider requesting that the jury be
informed that a consequence of its allocation of fault to immune actors is
that the plaintiff will not be able to recover for such amounts.
b.

Government employees

In 1977 the Legislature enacted the Wyoming Governmental Claims
Act.' 03 The Act recognized the continued vitality of the defense of sovereign immunity, except where otherwise specified in the Act." As a
result, public employees of all units of state and local government are
immune from tort liability while acting within the scope of their employment except as specified in the Act. In addition, in those instances where
98. WYO. STAT.
99. See id.

§§ 27-14-102(a)(xi),

-104(a) (Supp. 1995).

100. WYO. STAT. § 27-14-104(a) (Supp. 1995).
101.

Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Maddux Well Serv., 586 P.2d 1220, 1224 (Wyo. 1978).

102. Id.
103. 1979 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 157 (codified at WYo. STAT. §§ 1-39-101 to -120 (1988 &
Supp. 1995)).
104.

Wyo. STAT. § 1-39-102 (1988).
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the statute abrogates sovereign immunity, liability of the governmental
entity, including a public employee acting within the scope of employment, is limited." °
The immunity conferred by the Governmental Claims Act means that
one or more "actors" may not be susceptible to suit and/or liability (and
even if not immune, liability will be limited). Once again, non-immune
actors will have a strong incentive to argue that the plaintiff's injuries
were caused by immune nonparties. And once again, the immunity provided by the Governmental Claims Act is not going to surprise a plaintiff.
As with the Worker's Compensation Act, the plaintiff should know early
on who is immune and who is not. The plaintiff will then be in a position
to decide whether it is worth proceeding, and how to best counter the
inevitable defense that the injury was primarily the fault of an immune
actor. Since the decision to afford immunity is a legislative one, there is
little a plaintiff can do about it, other than consider requesting that the
jury be informed that a consequence of its allocation of fault to immune
actors is that the plaintiff will not be able to recover for such amounts.
c.

The immunities issue

Authorizing a jury to allocate fault to immune nonparties that are not
represented at and do not appear at the trial raises the questions of whether the jury should be told why the immune parties are not present, what
the effect of immunity is, and how that immunity will affect the plaintiff's
ability to collect a judgment.
One can certainly argue that a jury should be informed of the effect
of the immunity provided by the Worker's Compensation Act and/or the
Governmental Claims Act. To do otherwise is to leave the jury in the
dark, blindfolded to "the consequences of its determination.' 0 Conversely, one can argue that immunity is not a consequence of the jury's allocation of fault; rather, it is a consequence of a legislative decision to afford
immunity to some groups of actors. Accordingly, one can argue that the
jury should not be "tainted" with the knowledge that certain actors are
immune because with such knowledge, the jury may allocate more liability to those parties that are not immune.

105. Liability shall not exceed $250,000 for any claimant for any number of claims arising out
of a single transaction or occurrence, or $500,000 for all claims of all claimants arising out of a single transaction or occurrence. WYO. STAT. § 1-39-118(a) (Supp. 1995).
106. See Wyo. STAT. § l-l-109(c)(i)(B) (Supp. 1995) (The court "shall ...

inform the jury of

the consequences of its determination of the percentage of fault."). See also, Burton v. Fisher Controls Co., 723 P.2d 1214, 1222 n.6 (Wyo. 1986).
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Necessity for ProceduralSafeguards

The defendants that are joined as parties have an obvious incentive
to blame nonparty actors; the more fault that the jury allocates to
nonparties, the less there is to allocate to parties. Accordingly, nonparty
actors present the plaintiff with a heightened burden. In addition to proving liability by those actors subject to suit, the plaintiff must be prepared
to disprove the liability of nonparty actors. That additional burden presents significant due process issues.
Wyoming is one of a handful of states that allow a fact finder to
allocate fault or negligence to nonparties." 7 Most of those states have
enacted one or both of the following procedural safeguards: (1) a defendant that intends to argue that a nonparty was at least partially at fault
must give the plaintiff notice of that intention; and (2) the burden of
proving a nonparty was at fault is on the defendant alleging the defense.
In Colorado and Arizona, for example, the fact finder may allocate fault
to a nonparty if the claimant settled with the nonparty or if the defending
party gives notice within a specified time after initiation of the lawsuit that a
nonparty was wholly or partially at fault.' This levels the playing field a bit
by preventing the plaintiff from being sandbagged at trial.
The Indiana statute requires notice and shifts the burden of proof. A
defendant may affirmatively plead a "nonparty defense" that the damages
of the plaintiff were caused in full or in part by a nonparty. The burden
of proof of a nonparty defense is on that defendant.,t "9
Wyoming's new statute (and its old statute), by contrast, has no

107. The other states are: Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506(B) (1994 & Supp.

1995)); California (Scott v. County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 643, 658 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)
(citation omitted)); Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-111.5(3)(b) (West Supp. 1995));

Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-33-5(a)(1), -10(a) (Bums Supp. 1995)); Montana (MONT. CODE
ANN. § 27-1-703(4) (1987) (The Montana Supreme Court held the provision unconstitutional in
Newville v. Department of Family Servs., 883 P.2d 793 (1994). The Montana Legislature subsequently enacted procedural protections to remedy the constitutional deficiencies. 1995 Mont. Laws ch.
330.)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-l(B) (1989)); New York (N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L & R
§ 1601 (McKinney Supp. 1996)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1995));

Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT, ANN. tit. 23, § 13 (West 1987)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-1119(e) (1994)); and Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-38(4) (Supp. 1995) (jury may allocate fault to
persons immune from suit)).
The Uniform Act allows fault to be allocated to each claimant, defendant, third-party defen-

dant, and any person who has been released from liability. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT
§ 2(a)(2), 12 U.L.A. 50-51 (Supp. 1995).

108. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-11.5(3)(b) (West Supp. 1995); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-2506(B) (1994 & Supp. 1995).

109. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-33-10(b) (Bums Supp. 1995).
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procedural safeguards to protect a claimant from having to battle the
ghost of a nonparty actor whose existence was unknown to the claimant
until trial. The lack of any such procedural safeguards led the Montana
Supreme Court to find a similar provision of the Montana comparative
negligence statute to be unconstitutional.
In Newville v. Department of Family Services,"' the Montana Supreme Court found the inclusion of nonparties in the allocation of fault in
the absence of procedural safeguards for the plaintiff violated plaintiffs'
substantive due process rights. The Newville case is instructive for three
reasons. First, the inclusion of nonparty actors in the allocation of fault
under the new Wyoming statute is similar in effect to the provision of the
Montana statute that was stricken as unconstitutional. Second, the due
process clauses of the Montana and Wyoming constitutions are identical,
and both are substantially similar to the Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution. Finally, the substantive due process analysis used by
the Montana Supreme Court is similar to that adopted by the Wyoming
Supreme Court in other contexts.
In 1987 the Montana Legislature enacted a series of tort reform
measures, including amendments to the comparative negligence statute.
Those amendments were intended to "match liability for damages to
fault of each of the parties involved in a tort action.""' The express
aim of the changes was to "protect 'deep pocket' defendants . . . when

they were faced with minimal percentages of negligence."" 2 To assist
in achieving that goal, the amended Montana comparative negligence
statute included language allowing the jury to allocate fault to
nonparties:
For purposes of determining the percentage of liability attributable
to each party whose action contributed to the injury complained
of, the trier of fact shall consider the negligence of the claimant,
injured person, defendants, third-party defendants, persons released from liability by the claimant, persons immune from liability to the claimant, and any other persons who have a defense
against the claimant. The trier of fact shall apportion the percentage of negligence of all such persons .

110. 883 P.2d 793, 803 (Mont. 1994).
111. Id. at 799.
112. Id.
113. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-703(4) (1987). The Montana statute was amended in 1995 to
remedy the constitutional deficiencies found by the Newville court. See infra note 126.
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The Montana comparative negligence statute was challenged as
violating the constitutional guarantees of procedural due process, substantive due process and equal protection.114 The Montana Supreme Court
found the statute to violate substantive due process rights, and did not,
therefore, address the other constitutional challenges." 5
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution says that: "No state shall

. . .

deprive any person of

"...""6 The Monlife, liberty or property, without due process of law .
tana Constitution contains an identical guarantee: "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.""' The
Wyoming Constitution contains language identical to Montana's.'

The Montana Supreme Court began by discussing the theoretical
basis for incorporating a substantive due process component in the due
process clause. Substantive due process, said the court, exists to preclude
"arbitrary governmental actions regardless of the procedures used to
implement them, and serves as a check on oppressive governmental action.""' Substantive due process review applies, therefore, when a legislative enactment affects individual constitutional rights. Accordingly,
courts may review a statute's "inherent procedural fairness."' 2 A statute
that limits a person's rights or remedies must be "reasonably related to a
permissible legislative objective."'21
The appellants in Newville argued that allowing a jury to allocate
fault to nonparties was unconstitutional because of alleged procedural
unfairness. There was, according to the appellants, no reasonable basis
for requiring a plaintiff to prepare and present a defense "at the last
minute" to a nonparty that a defendant seeks to blame for the plaintiff's
injury, and there was "no reasonable basis for requiring plaintiffs to
examine jury instructions, marshal evidence, make objections, argue the
case, and examine witnesses from the standpoint of unrepresented parties."'" The court agreed.
114. Newville, 883 P.2d at 799.
115. Id. The court did not indicate whether it was deciding the case under the Montana Constitution or the United States Constitution. Given the similarity of the two, the analysis would, presumably, be identical.
116.
117.

U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
MONT. CONSr. art. II, § 17.

118. WYO. CONST. art. I, § 6.
119. Newville, 883 P.2d at 799-800.
120. Id. at 800.
121.

Id.

122. Id. at 802. The "last minute" issue arose because the Montana statute did not require a
defendant to disclose the intention to rely at trial on the defense that the plaintiff's injury was the fault
of some nonparty.
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Permitting the allocation of negligence to nonparties in the absence of procedural safeguards forces the plaintiff to "anticipate
defendants' attempts to apportion blame... [and] is clearly unreasonable as to plaintiffs. " " Therefore, the court concluded that the Montana comparative negligence statute violated substantive due process by
including "persons released from liability by the claimant, persons
immune from liability to the claimant, and any other persons who have
a defense against the claimant.""124

The Montana Supreme Court compared the Montana comparative
negligence statute with other states' statutes. It noted that while statutes in
other states allow the allocation of fault to certain nonparties, those statutes contain procedural safeguards to protect the plaintiff." The court
referred to the Colorado and Indiana statutes, in particular.t
The Wyoming comparative fault statute is vulnerable, as was the
Montana statute, to a substantive due process challenge. It is also on
shaky equal protection ground.
The Wyoming Supreme Court has recognized that due process,
under the United States and/or Wyoming Constitutions, includes procedural and substantive components. 2 7 As in Montana, substantive due
process protects an individual's life, liberty and property interests from
illegitimate governmental intrusion.' Those interests are infringed when
a statute is arbitrary and fails to promote a legitimate state objective
through reasonable means.2
The degree of judicial protection under substantive due process varies,
depending on the nature of the individual's interest." 3° Governmental actions
affecting fundamental interests receive strict judicial scrutiny. Actions affecting other interests, such as economic or property rights, do not. If the interest is not fundamental, the court merely examines the law at issue to deter123. Id.
124. Id. at 803. Because the statute had a severability clause, the court did not find the remainder of the statute unconstitutional.
125. Id. at 802.
126. Id. In response to the Newville decision, the Montana Legislature amended the comparative
negligence statute to incorporate safeguards for the plaintiff. 1995 Mont. Laws ch. 330. In particular,
a defendant that wishes to assert a "nonparty defense" bears the burden of proof on that issue, and
the defendant must affirmatively plead the defense in the answer (or, if discovered after the answer is
filed, with "reasonable promptness."). Id. § I (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-703(6)(c), (d)
(1995)).
127. Mills v. Reynolds, 807 P.2d 383, 395 (Wyo. 1991) (citation omitted). rev'd on other
grounds, 837 P.2d 48 (Wyo. 1992).
128. ROBERT B. KEITER & TIM NEWCOMB, THE WYOMING STATE CONSTITUTION 39 (1993).
129. Mills v. Reynolds, 807 P.2d at 395 (citation omitted).
130. KErrER & NEWCOMB, supra note 128, at 39.
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mine whether it promotes a legitimate state objective by reasonable means.' 3'
The classification of the interest is, therefore, critical to the analysis.
Because of the differing levels of judicial scrutiny under substantive
due process review, the first question is whether the inclusion of nonparty
actors in the allocation of fault involves a fundamental right. It may.
The Wyoming Supreme Court has suggested that one source of
fundamental rights is the Wyoming Constitution; provisions such as Article I, section 8, which guarantees equal access to the courts, enumerate
fundamental rights.'32 Whether rights not enumerated in the constitution
are fundamental can be determined by balancing the inherent rights of individuals against the police power of the state.13 The argument that the
allocation of fault to nonparties involves a fundamental right has its genesis in both the concepts of enumerated constitutional rights and the inherent rights of citizens of the state.
The Wyoming Constitution guarantees equal access to the courts:
All courts shall be open and every person for an injury done to a
person, reputation or property shall have justice administered without
sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the state in such
manner and in such courts as the legislature may by law decree."
Access to the courts, therefore, should be limited "only in exceptional
circumstances.

"'

Although the equal access to the courts provision does not prohibit
the legislature from imposing reasonable regulations, the court has used
the equal access provision as a basis to carefully scrutinize legislation that
imposes any restrictions on access to the courts.136 This provides a basis
for arguing that the allocation of fault to nonparties involves a fundamental right, meaning that the statute should be subjected to strict scrutiny
under a substantive due process analysis.
In addition to constitutional infirmity under a strict scrutiny, substantive due process challenge, the comparative fault statute may be constitutionally defective under the equal protection and equal access to the courts
provisions of the Wyoming Constitution.

131. Id.
132. Id.

133. Id.
134. WYo. CONS'.

art. I, § 8.

135. Williams v. Stafford, 589 P.2d 322, 325 (Wyo. 1979).
136. See, e.g., Hoem v. State. 756 P.2d 780, 784 (Wyo. 1988).
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In Hoem v. State, 3 ' the Wyoming Supreme Court cited the equal
access provision of the Wyoming Constitution in striking down the legislation which created the Wyoming Medical Review Panel. The court's
analysis in Hoem suggests that the comparative fault statute may also be
constitutionally defective.
Justice Macy, writing for the majority in Hoem, laid out the standards for considering an equal protection and/or equal access to the courts
constitutional challenge to a statute.g38 First, the party challenging a legislative classification bears the burden of showing that the classification is
not reasonable. Second, the court will sustain a classification if there is
any set of supporting facts that can be reasonably conceived. Third, while
the court gives great deference to legislative actions, "it is equally imperative that [the court] declare them invalid when they transgress the Wyoming Constitution." 39
Applying these standards, the court first analyzed the state interests
that the Medical Review Panel Act was intended to further: reducing the
filing of questionable medical malpractice claims, and equitably compensating persons with "well-founded" claims, thereby addressing the "perceived medical malpractice insurance 'crisis. '""' The court agreed that
protecting the public health and the economic and social stability of the
state were legitimate state interests. The question then became whether the
creation of the Medical Review Panel was a "reasonable and effective
means" of addressing those interests. It was not.
Requiring persons who desired to bring medical malpractice
actions to appear before a Medical Review Panel before filing a claim
in court created two classes of potential plaintiffs: (1) those seeking
compensation for injuries allegedly caused by medical malpractice; and
(2) those seeking compensation for injuries allegedly caused by any
other tortious conduct. Those in the former class were subjected to an
additional burden not borne by those in the latter, review by a Medical
Review Panel. Additionally, health care practitioners were singled out
for protections not available to any other defendants. That scheme did
not pass constitutional muster.
In invalidating the Medical Review Act, the court held that conferring special benefits on the medical profession and imposing additional

137.
138.
139.
original)).
140.

756 P.2d at 784.
Id. at 782.
Id. (quoting Brenner v. City of Casper, 723 P.2d 558, 560 (Wyo. 1986) (emphasis in
Hoem, 756 P.2d at 782-83.
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burdens on the victims of medical malpractice bore no reasonable relationship to the protection of public health or economic and social stability.' 41 Furthermore, the court emphasized the principle that "constitutional
safeguards are not suspended in time of even the most legitimate crisis." 42 Using language that bodes ill for the comparative fault statute, the
court concluded: "We cannot condone the legislature's use of the law to
protect one class of people from financial difficulties while it dilutes the
rights under the constitution of another class of people." 43
Under Hoem, the first step in analyzing the constitutionality of the
comparative fault statute under an equal access analysis is to determine
the state interest that the comparative fault statute purports to further. Although there is no legislative history, it is probably safe to assume that
the state's interest is to protect defendants from having to pay more than
their share of a claimant's injuries. That is probably a legitimate state
interest. The question then becomes whether allocating fault to nonparty
actors, in the absence of due process protections for claimants, is a reasonable and effective means of addressing that interest. It is not.
The comparative fault statute, as the Medical Review Act, creates
two classes of persons: claimants seeking recovery in a lawsuit where all
the actors that caused the injury are known and joined as defendants; and
claimants seeking recovery in a lawsuit where one or more actors cannot
be joined as a defendant because an actor is unknown, immune or not
susceptible to service. That classification imposes additional burdens on
the second group of claimants, and confers benefits on defendants in
lawsuits where there are nonparty actors. While it is true that persons in
those classifications cannot be identified in advance of an injury, the burdens and benefits resulting from the classification are no less real-and no
more defensible.
The result of the classification is that a claimant in an action that
cannot join one or more actors is placed at a significant disadvantage.
And those defendants that are joined receive a significant advantage. The
advantage to the defendants that are joined is obvious. They can blame
the missing actor(s); to the extent they are successful, the jury will allocate fault to missing actors, thereby reducing, or even eliminating, the
defendants' liability and the plaintiff's recovery. The disadvantage to the
claimant is simply the reverse of the benefit to the joined defendants. In
141. Id. at 783. In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Urbigkit, noted that
the act was clearly unconstitutional under "the 'heightened scrutiny' test," and failed even under a
rational basis test. Id. at 785.
142. Id. at 783 (quoting Waggoner v. Gibson, 647 F. Supp. 1102, 1107 (N.D. Tex. 1986)).
143. Hoem, 756 P.2d at 784.
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addition to proving the defendant(s) liable, the claimant must disprove, or
at least minimize, the fault attributable to nonparty actors.
Should a claimant refuse to pick up and carry the standard of nonparty actors, the claimant may well suffer a significantly diminished
recovery if the defendants succeed in convincing the jury of the fault of
nonparty actors. Under the analysis set forth in Hoem, the benefit to the
party defendants, which is simultaneously an additional burden to the
claimant, suggests that allocating liability to nonparty actors is unconstitutional, in the absence of procedural protections for plaintiffs, under the
equal access guarantee of the Wyoming Constitution.
IV. GUIDELINES FOR INTERPRETING AND APPLYING THE STATUTE
Perhaps the biggest issue in interpreting and applying the statute is
how to instruct juries on the meaning of "fault." In particular, the meaning of "proximate cause" will present a challenge to courts. Read literally, juries will be expected to engage in a two-step process. First, they
will be asked to determine whether the acts or omissions of specified actors were a proximate cause of the claimant's injuries. Then they will be
asked whether any of those actors who were found to be a proximate
cause were in any manner negligent, subject to liability for strict liability,
strict products liability, including breach of warranty, assumption of risk
and misuse or alteration of a product. The problem with such an instruction is that a jury may become hopelessly confused. The current pattern
jury instructions on comparative negligence say: A person is at fault when
that person is negligent and that person's negligence is a cause of the
injury or damages for which the claim is made.'" That instruction will
have to be substantially modified. Proposed jury instructions follow.
10.01

Comparative Fault - Theory and Effect
(Single Plaintiff and Single Defendant)

Liability in this case must be determined by comparing the
fault, if any, of the claimant (also called the "plaintiff') and the
defendant. Therefore, in deciding this case you will need to know
what "fault" means.
When the word "fault" is used in these instructions to refer
to the claimant's behavior, it means that the acts or omissions of
the claimant:

144. W.C.P.J.I. Nos. 10.01, 10.03 (1994).
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(1)Were [negligent, involved assumption of risk or negligent misuse or alteration of a product]; 45 and
(2) Were a substantial factor in causing the claimant's
harm.
When the word "fault" is used in these instructions to refer
to the defendant's behavior, it means that the acts or omissions of
the defendant:
(1) Were [negligent or would lead to the imposition of strict
liability, strict products liability or breach of warranty]; t" and
(2) Were a substantial factor in causing the claimant's harm
It will be necessary for you to determine the percentage of
fault, if any, of the claimant and the defendant. It will also be
necessary for you to determine the amount of damages, if any,
suffered by the claimant.
Your findings about fault will affect the claimant's recovery.
It is my duty to explain how that may occur.
The defendant's liability for damages is limited to the percentage of fault, if any, that you find is attributable to the
defendant.
The claimant's recovery will be reduced by the percentage
of fault, if any, that you find is attributable to the claimant.
Should you find that the claimant's fault is more than fifty
percent, the claimant will not be entitled to recover any damages.
In explaining the consequences of your verdict, I have not
meant to imply that either the claimant or defendant is at fault.
That is for you to decide.
Other instructions may be necessary, including instructions on "assumption of risk" or "misuse or alteration of a product."

145. Whether to include the terms "negligence," "assumption of risk," or "misuse or alteration
of a product" will depend on the evidence. If, for example, there is evidence to support an instruction
on negligence, that term should be included. If there is not, it should not be. Similarly, if there is
evidence to support an instruction on negligent misuse or alteration of a product, that instruction
should be given. And since it is extremely unlikely that the claimant's actions or inactions could subject the claimant to strict liability, strict products liability or breach of warranty, including those terms
in the instructions seems guaranteed to do nothing but confuse the jury.
146. The "fault" of the defendant will be limited to the claim or claims asserted by the claimant. If there is no claim that the defendant is strictly liable, for example, that language should not be
included because the defendant could not be "subject to strict liability."
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Comparative Fault - Assumption of Risk 47
The defendant claims that the claimant was at fault because
the claimant assumed the risk presented by the defendant's activity. "Assumed the risk" means that [the claimant knew about the
danger presented by the activity in which the defendant was engaged, and voluntarily decided to proceed in spite of that danger]
[the claimant knew of a defect in the product and voluntarily
decided to use the product in spite of the danger]."'s The claimant
is not at fault if he or she simply failed to discover the danger
presented by [the defendant's dangerous activity] [the dangerous
product]."

Comparative Fault - Misuse or Alteration of a Product
The defendant claims that the claimant was at fault because
the claimant misused or altered the product which caused the
claimant's injury. A product is misused or altered if the claimant
used it in a way that was: (1) negligent; (2) not reasonably foreseeable; and either (3) unintended or (4) obviously dangerous to
the claimant.
If the case involves multiple defendants, pattern jury instruction
10.03 (Comparative Fault - Theory and Effect; Single Plaintiff and Multiple Defendant) should be similarly amended. The more difficult issue will
be the instruction for cases involving nonparty actors. Pattern instruction
10.05 should be amended as follows.
10.05

Comparative Fault - Where a Nonparty Defense is
Raised

In this case, the defendant claims that

,

who is

not a party to this lawsuit, was at fault for causing the claimant's
injuries, at least in part. A nonparty who may be responsible for
helping to cause the injuries of the claimant is called an "actor."
147. If the defendant in a negligence case has asserted primary assumption of risk as a defense,

the jury should be instructed on that defense separately. The instruction should be separate, and
should be entitled "primary assumption of risk," because if the jury finds primary assumption of risk
by the plaintiff, the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff and the case is over. There is no fault to

compare. See supra notes 42 through 51 and accompanying text.
148. The first clause should be used if the claim involves strict liability based on an abnormally
dangerous activity. The second should be used if the claim involves strict products liability.
149. The first clause should be used if the claim involves strict liability based on an abnormally
dangerous activity. The second should be used if the claim involves strict products liability.
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Even though
has not appeared at this trial or offered
evidence, you must determine whether
_
was at fault.

If so, you must determine the percentage of fault attributable to
When the word "fault" is used in these instructions to describe the behavior of a nonparty actor, it means that the acts or
omissions of that actor:
(1) Were [negligent, would subject the actor to strict liability, strict products liability or breach of warranty];3 0 and
(2) Were a substantial factor in causing the claimant's
harm.
The instructions proposed above do not use the term "proximate
cause," even though that language is part of the definition of fault. There
are three reasons for that omission. First, under any circumstances,
"proximate cause" is an ambiguous and ill-defined term that will likely
only confuse a jury. Second, the term is even more confusing when taken
out of its historical context of tying together tortious conduct and injuries
and used, instead, as a threshold criterion for determining fault. Third,
the "substantial factor" language, which has been adopted by the Restatement and used by the Wyoming Supreme Court, allows a jury to
make the common sense factual determination of whether the acts or
omissions were a "substantial factor" in causing the harm.' 5'
Courts will also face the issue of informing a jury of "the consequences of its determination of fault." Under the old statute, courts apparently informed the jury of at least four consequences of its allocation of
fault: (1) the plaintiffs recovery would be reduced by the percentage of
fault allocated to him or her; (2) the plaintiff could not recover if the
allocation of fault to the plaintiff exceeded fifty percent; (3) each defendant would be liable only for the percentage of fault allocated to that
defendant; and (4) which actors had "available pockets" and which were
on the verdict form only for allocation of responsibility purposes.' 52 There
are additional consequences under both the old and new statutes.

150. Which term or terms to include will depend on whether there is evidence to support such
an instruction. Itmakes no sense, for example, to include "strict products liability" in the definition
of fault unless the actor in question was involved in distributing a product. Further, it is hard to
envisage circumstances in which the acts or omissions of a nonparty actor could subject that actor to
assumption of risk or misuse or alteration of a product.
151. The second half of the Restatement's definition of "legal cause" is whether "there is no
nile of law relieving the actor from liability." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965). If
there is such a rule, the case should never go to the jury.
152. W.C.P.J.1. Nos. 10.01, 10.03, 10.05 (1994); see also Burton v. Fisher Controls Co., 723
P.2d 1214, 1222 n.6 (Wyo. 1986).
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The parties may wish to consider asking the court to inform the jury
of additional consequences. For example, the plaintiff may wish to have
the jury informed that there will be no recovery from immune actors.'
Such actors do not have "available pockets," and the language of the act
and the Burton decision can be read to support such a request.
Finally, jury instructions cannot address the issue of the potential
prejudice to a claimant that does not know that a defendant intends to use
a nonparty actor defense. To avoid the surprise of having to defend
against the claim that nonparty actor(s) unknown to the claimant were
really at fault, the claimant should attempt to discover the identity of any
such nonparty actors. The mechanism available to do so is interrogatories.
It is a foolish claimant who does not ask the defendant to identify all
nonparty actors that the defendant believes to be partially at fault. Since
interrogatories are continuing in nature,"5 a defendant that fails to disclose a nonparty actor before trial should be precluded from offering the
"fault" of that unidentified nonparty actor as a defense at trial. 5
Although surprise can be virtually eliminated through discovery, the
additional burden of having to effectively disprove a nonparty actor defense will remain. Short of an amendment to the statute, a claimant will
have to be prepared to prove the liability of the defendants, and disprove
the liability of nonparty actors.
V. SUGGESTED CHANGES

There are at least three serious flaws in the statute. First, the
definition of "fault" is confusing and overbroad. Second, the lack of
procedural safeguards to protect claimants from the nonparty actor
defense is likely unconstitutional (and extremely unfair to claimants,
even if not unconstitutional). And finally, the statute should not even
arguably apply to non-tort claims, intentional torts or torts based on
reckless disregard or willful and wanton conduct by a defendant. All
three defects should be remedied.' 5

153. For a complete discussion of informing the jury of the consequences of its decision see
supra part II.C.2.
154. See WYO. R. CIV. P. 26(e).
155. If the defendant only discovers the existence of another potentially liable actor on the eve
of trial, it seems that, at a minimum, the court should grant a continuance to allow the plaintiff the
opportunity to prepare a counter-attack to the defendant's newly discovered defense.
156. The proposed statute, reflecting the changes discussed below, appears in Appendix C.
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Redefine "Fault"

The definition of "fault" is confusing and overbroad in several ways.
First, having "proximate cause" serve as the prerequisite to a finding of
"fault" makes no sense. Second, failing to separate out conduct of a
claimant from that of other actors is unnecessarily confusing. And finally,
allowing certain non-negligent conduct of a claimant or other actor to be a
defense to a defendant's negligent conduct creates conceptual and implementation problems.
Eliminating the "proximate cause" language would simplify the
definition without expanding it. The reason is that conduct that is "negligent" or that would subject an actor to strict liability, strict products
liability or breach of warranty is, by definition, conduct that was a proximate cause of the claimant's injury. The "proximate cause" language adds
nothing but confusion.
Separating out the language that describes the "fault" of claimants
from that which describes the "fault" of other actors would greatly clarify
the applicability of the statute. The admixture of "conduct that could subject an actor to strict liability, strict tort liability or breach of warranty"
and "assumption of risk or misuse or alteration of a product" has resulted
in a hodgepodge that will require sorting out in each case where the
statute is applied.
Finally, allowing the comparison of negligent and non-negligent conduct, which will, in some cases, hold the claimant and/or nonparty actors to
a higher standard than the defendant, lacks a coherent philosophical basis and
will be difficult to implement. The statute should restrict any comparison to
like kinds of conduct, thereby treating all actors more fairly.
The pendulum has swung too far in the direction of defendants, at
the expense of plaintiffs. To correct the distortion, the definition of fault
should be amended.'" The suggested changes would eliminate the

157.

See Appendix C, § 1-1-109(a)(iv) for the proposed changes to the definition of fault.

The following examples illustrate how the new definition would affect recovery when claims for both
negligence and strict products liability are brought and fault is allocated differently for each claim.
Assume a claimant sues a defendant for negligence and strict products liability. The defendant asserts the defense of comparative negligence to the former claim, and assumption of risk to the
latter. The jury allocates fault on the negligence issue 50% (defendant) and 50% (claimant), and on
the strict products liability issue 60% (defendant) and 40% (claimant). The plaintiff should be allowed
to recover 60% under the strict products liability claim since comparative negligence is not a defense
to strict products liability. Appendix C, § l-l-109(a)(iv)(C)(l).

Assume a claimant sues a defendant for negligence and strict products liability. The defendant asserts the defense of comparative negligence to the former claim, and assumption of risk to the
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problems with trying to define and implement "proximate cause," clarify
the applicability of the statute to claimants and other actors, and prevent
the comparison of negligent and non-negligent conduct, all without undermining the Legislature's clear intent to overrule Phillips v. Duro-Last by
allowing a comparison of fault in strict liability and breach of warranty
cases. In the end, a claimant's awards would be reduced or eliminated
based on "fault" that is truly comparable to the defendant's, and defendants would be liable only for their proportionate share of fault. Defendants would not benefit, as they do under the new statute, from a comparison of their negligent conduct and the non-negligent conduct of others,
including the claimant.
Since the definition of "fault" eliminates the use of and necessity for
the "proximate cause" language, the term "proximate cause" should also
be eliminated from the definition of "actor."
B.

Provide ProceduralProtectionsfor Claimants

The statute should provide procedural safeguards to protect claimants
in cases involving the potential allocation of fault to nonparty actors. Two
important safeguards should be created: notice to claimants of a nonparty
defense, and making explicit that the burden of proving that defense rests
with the defendant that asserts it.
As previously discussed, the lack of procedural protections for claimants subject to a nonparty actor defense may well render the statute unconstitutional. Even if the statute is constitutional, the lack of protections is unfair
to claimants. The balance between allowing defendants the defense that a
nonparty actor was at fault and treating claimants fairly is easily restored.
The Indiana statute allows a defendant to argue that a nonparty was a
cause of a plaintiff's injuries, but "[t]he burden of proof of a nonparty defense is upon the defendant, who must affirmatively plead the defense. " '
This accomplishes two objectives. First, the plaintiff does not have to assume
the additional burden of proving the non-liability of nonparty actors. Second,
the plaintiff will be put on notice of a defendant's intention to argue a nonparty defense. The revised Montana statute contains similar requirements.' 59

latter. The jury allocates fault on the negligence issue 60% (defendant) and 40% (claimant), and on
the strict products liability issue 50% (defendant) and 50% (claimant). The plaintiff should be allowed
to recover only the lesser amount (40%) since the claimant's assumption of risk involves more culpability than mere contributory negligence. It is, in essence, a defense to the negligence claim. Appendix C, § l-1-109(a)(iv)(C)(2).
158.

IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-33-10(b) (Bums Supp. 1995).

159. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-703(6)(c), (d) (1995).
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The Wyoming statute should be amended to include a new subdivision which provides for a nonparty defense, requires that the defense be
affirmatively pled in the defendant's answer, and shifts the burden of a
nonparty defense to the defendant who raised it. Such a change would
level the playing field, which has shifted in favor of defendants. Claimants would be put on notice of a defendant's intention of using a nonparty
defense," ° and the defendant would have the burden of proving that defense-just as the defendant has the burden of proving any other defense.
The underlying objective of preventing a defendant from having to pay
more than his or her share would be preserved.
C.

Clarify That the Statute Does Not Apply to Non-tort Claims or Intentional Torts

The legitimacy of any comparison is comparability. Allowing a
claimant's non-negligent or negligent conduct to be a defense to a nontort claim, such as breach of contract, is not appropriate because the
parties' actions do not involve comparable conduct. 6 ' Similarly, a
comparison between a defendant's intentional and/or reckless conduct
and a claimant's negligent conduct is inherently suspect. Although the
statute should be construed to prevent such comparisons, it should be
amended to eliminate any argument that comparative fault can be a
defense in such actions by adding a new sentence at the end of (b):
"The defense of contributory fault shall not be available with respect
to any non-tort claim made by a claimant, or any claim in which an
element of the claim is that the defendant acted intentionally, recklessly, or willfully and/or wantonly."
VI. CONCLUSION
Whatever the intent behind the new act, it represents a significant victory for defendants, and a significant loss for plaintiffs. There is no empirical
evidence to justify such a radical change to Wyoming's tort law. 6

160. If a defendant discovers a nonparty defense after filing an answer, that answer may be
amended; leave to amend is to "be freely given when justice so requires." WYO. R. CIV. P. 15(a).
161. Comparative negligence is not a defense to a breach of contract claim. See, e.g., Becker v.
BancOhio Nat'l Bank, 478 N.E.2d 776, 781 (Ohio 1985).
162. The available evidence is to the contrary. See, e.g., Brian C. Shuck & Susan Martin,
Comment, Wyoming Tort Reform and the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis:A Second Opinion,
28 LAND & WATER L. REV. 593, 625 (1993) (concluding that there was not a medical malpractice
litigation crisis during the 1970s and 1980s, despite media reports to the contrary).
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Comparative negligence was designed to "ameliorate the harsh effects of the contributory negligence rule. " 163 Now, the pendulum has
swung so far that in some situations, claimants are worse off than they
were under the "harsh" contributory negligence rule. The result distorts
the tort system to unfairly favor defendants. A system that unfairly favors
one side over the other is not in the best interests of anyone but insurance
companies, for they are the only entities that are invariably defendants.
When the pendulum appeared to swing too far to favor plaintiffs, the
Legislature responded with a series of tort reform measures to adjust the
balance. "6In the absence of any evidence to show that such reforms have
been insufficient, it is now time for some tort reform that benefits plaintiffs, and thereby begins to restore fairness to all parties.

163. Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 194 (Wyo. 1979)
164. For example, the Legislature abolished joint and several liability. 1986 Wyo. Sess. Laws
ch. 24, § 1.
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APPENDIX A: THE OLD STATUTE
§ 1-1-109.

COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE.

(a)

Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action by any
person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence
resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if the contributory negligence of the said person is not more than fifty percent
(50%) of the total fault. Any damages allowed shall be diminished in
proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the person
recovering.

(b)

The court may, and when requested by any party shall:
(i) If a jury trial:
(A) Direct the jury to find separate special verdicts determining
the total amount of damages and the percentage of fault
attributable to each actor whether or not a party; and
(B) Inform the jury of the consequences of its determination of
the percentage of fault.
(ii) If a trial before the court without jury, make special findings of
fact, determining the total amount of damages and the percentage of fault attributable to each actor whether or not a party.

(c)

The court shall reduce the amount of damages determined under
subsection (b) of this section in proportion to the amount of fault
attributed to the person recovering and enter judgment against each
defendant in the amount determined under subsection (d) of this section.

(d)

Each defendant is liable only for that proportion of the total dollar
amount determined as damages under paragraph (b)(i) or (ii) of this
section in the percentage of the amount of fault attributed to him
under paragraph (b)(i) or (ii) of this section.
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APPENDIX B: THE NEW STATUTE
§ 1-1-109. COMPARATIVE FAULT.
(a)

As used in this section:
(i)

"Actor" means a person or other entity, including the claimant,
whose fault is determined to be a proximate cause of the death,
injury or damage, whether or not the actor is a party to the
litigation;

(ii) "Claimant" means a natural person, including the personal
representative of a deceased person, or any legal entity, including corporations, limited liability companies, partnerships or
unincorporated associations, and includes a third party plaintiff
and a counterclaiming defendant;
(iii) "Defendant" means a party to the litigation against whom a
claim for damages is asserted, and includes third party defendants. Where there is a counterclaim, the claimant against
whom the counterclaim is asserted is also a defendant;
(iv) "Fault" includes acts or omissions, determined to be a proximate cause of death or injury to person or property, that are in
any measure negligent, or that subject an actor to strict tort or
strict products liability, and includes breach of warranty, assumption of risk and misuse or alteration of a product;
(v) "Injury to person or property," in addition to bodily injury,
includes, without limitation, loss of enjoyment of life, emotional
distress, pain and suffering, disfigurement, physical or mental
disability, loss of earnings or income, damage to reputation,
loss of consortium, loss of profits and all other such claims and
causes of action arising out of the fault of an actor;
(vi) "Wrongful death" means that cause of action authorized by
Wyoming statute to recover money damages when the death of a
person is caused by the fault of an actor such as would have
entitled the party injured to maintain an action to recover damages if death had not ensued.
(b)

Contributory fault shall not bar a recovery in an action by any
claimant or the claimant's legal representative to recover damages
for wrongful death or injury to person or property, if the contributory fault of the claimant is not more than fifty percent (50%) of the
total fault of all actors. Any damages allowed shall be diminished in
proportion to the amount of fault attributed to the claimant.
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Whether or not the claimant is free of fault, the court shall:
(i) If a jury trial:
(A) Direct the jury to determine the total amount of damages
sustained by the claimant without regard to the percentage
of fault attributed to the claimant, and the percentage of
fault attributable to each actor; and
(B) Inform the jury of the consequences of its determination of
the percentage of fault.
(ii) If a trial before the court without jury, make special findings of
fact, determining the total amount of damages sustained by the
claimant without regard to the percentage of fault attributed to the
claimant, and the percentage of fault attributable to each actor.

(d) The court shall reduce the amount of damages determined under
subsection (c) of this section in proportion to the percentage of fault
attributed to the claimant and enter judgment against each defendant
in the amount determined under subsection (e) of this section.
(e)

Each defendant is liable only to the extent of that defendant's proportion of the total fault determined under paragraph (c)(i) or (ii) of
this section.
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APPENDIX C: THE PROPOSED STATUTE
§ 1-1-109. COMPARATIVE FAULT.

(a)

As used in this section:
(i) "Actor" means a person or other entity, including the claimant,
whose fault is deter-Aned to be a proximate a cause of the
claimant's death, injury or damage, whether or not the actor is a
party to the litigation;
(ii) "Claimant" means a natural person, including the personal
representative of a deceased person, or any legal entity, including corporations, limited liability companies, partnerships or
unincorporated associations, and includes a third party plaintiff
and a counterclaiming defendant;
(iii) "Defendant" means a party to the litigation against whom a
claim for damages is asserted, and includes third party defendants. Where there is a counterclaim, the claimant against
whom the counterclaim is asserted is also a defendant;
(iv) "Fault" has the following meaning: includes actors or omi:-io..
determincfid to be a prc*fi8mate as: of death or injur to pcrsen
or property, that arc in any measuro negligent, o~r that uj
an at~tofl $-Ae c to;rt cstrit
products liability, and includes
broareh kef warranty, assumption ef Fisk and misuse or alteration
Of a PFO&6t.

(AI In an action where the claimant seeks recovery based
on the negligence of the defendant(s), "fault" means an
act or omission by any actor, including the claimant,
that is negligent.

(3)In an action where the claimant seeks recovery based
on strict liability, strict products liability or breach of
warranty, "fault" means:
(1)With respect to an actor other than the claimant,
any acts or omissions that would subject the actor
to strict liability, strict products liability or breach
of warranty: and
(2)With respect to a claimant, negligent misuse or
alteration of a product, or the use of a product in
an obviously dangerous way.
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(L In an action where the claimant seeks recovery based
on negligence and strict liability, strict products liability or breach of warranty, "fault" shall be determined
separately for each claim, using the definitions in (A)
and (B).
(1)If the fact finder allocates more fault to the claimant with respect to the claimant's negligence claim
than with respect to the claimant's other claims,
the claimant may recover based on the allocation
of fault on the claim(s) for strict liability, strict
products liability or breach of warranty.

(2)If the fact finder allocates more fault to the claimant with respect to the claimant's claim(s) for strict
liability, strict products liability or breach of warranty than with respect to the claim for negligence,
the claimant shall recover the lesser amount
(v) "Injury to person or property," in addition to bodily injury,
includes, without limitation, loss of enjoyment of life, emotional
distress, pain and suffering, disfigurement, physical or mental
disability, loss of earnings or income, damage to reputation,
loss of consortium, loss of profits and all other such claims and
causes of action arising out of the fault of an actor;
(vi) "Wrongful death" means that cause of action authorized by
Wyoming statute to recover money damages when the death of a
person is caused by the fault of an actor such as would have
entitled the party injured to maintain an action to recover damages if death had not ensued.
(b)

Contributory fault shall not bar a recovery in an action by any
claimant or the claimant's legal representative to recover damages
for wrongful death or injury to person or property, if the contributory fault of the claimant is not more than fifty percent (50% ) of the
total fault of all actors. Any damages allowed shall be diminished in
proportion to the amount of fault attributed to the claimant. The
defense of contributory fault shall not be available with respect to
any non-tort claim made by a claimant, or any claim in which an
element of the claim is that the defendant acted intentionally, recklessly, or willfully and/or wantonly.

(c)

Whether or not the claimant is free of fault, the court shall:
(i) If a jury trial:
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(A) Direct the jury to determine the total amount of damages
sustained by the claimant without regard to the percentage
of fault attributed to the claimant, and the percentage of
fault attributable to each actor; and
(B) Inform the jury of the consequences of its determination of
the percentage of fault.
(ii) If a trial before the court without jury, make special findings
of fact, determining the total amount of damages sustained by
the claimant without regard to the percentage of fault attribut-

ed to the claimant, and the percentage of fault attributable to
each actor.
(d)

Nonparty defense.

(i) In an action under this statute, a defendant may assert as a
defense that the damages of the claimant were caused in full or
part by a nonparty. Such a defense is referred to as a nonparty
defense and must be affirmatively pled in the defendant's answer.
(ji) The burden of proof of a nonparty defense is on the defendant
who raised it.
(iii) Nothing in this subsection relieves the claimant of the burden
of proving that fault on the part of the defendant(s) caused, in
whole or in part, the damages of the claimant.
(e)

The court shall reduce the amount of damages determined under
subsection (c) of this section in proportion to the percentage of fault
attributed to the claimant and enter judgment against each defendant
in the amount determined under subsection (e) of this section.

(f)

Each defendant is liable only to the extent of that defendant's proportion of the total fault determined under paragraph (c)(i) or (ii) of
this section.
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